THE LIMITED CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION-THE RECURRING
ANSWER
WILLIAM W. VAN ALSTYNE*

To the Editors:
Recently, this Journal carried a very brief essay of mine on
amending the Constitution.1 Immediately thereafter, Professor Dellinger published a more elaborate article in the Yale Law Journalon the
same subject.' His article is a welcome addition to the growing literature in this area.' More amply documented than my original informal
essay, his article also appears to reach quite different conclusions. Our
differences are not so great, however, nor the basis of disagreement so
abstruse, that they cannot be addressed in published correspondence
rather than in a full-length reply. I write to share how I think he may
have drawn some unwarranted inferences from the materials he has
reviewed and yet, in the end, how rather marginal the area of actual
disagreement turns out to be.
The general subject of our interest has been the portion of article
V that provides for the Constitutional Convention:
The Congress, whenever two-thirds of both Houses shall deem it
necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on application of the Legislaturesof two-thirds ofthe severalstates,shallcall
a ConventionforproposingAmendmentswhich, in either Case, shallbe
valid to all Intents and Purposes, when ratified by the Legislatures of
three-fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification
may be proposed by the Congress. 4
Our principal focus, and the point at which Professor Dellinger's views
diverge from mine, is the extent to which a conscientious Congress may
decline to call a convention despite receipt of at least thirty-four state
applications requesting such a convention to consider aparticularsub* William R. Perkins Professor of Law, Duke University.
1. Van Alstyne, DoesArtile VRestriet the States to Calling UnlimitedConventions Only?-A
Letter to a Colleague, 1978 DUKE L.J. 1295.
2. Dellinger, The Recurring Question of the "Limited" Constitutional Convention, 88 YALE
LJ. 1623 (1979).
3. See authorities cited in note 24 infra.
4. U.S. Co~sr. art. V (emphasis added).
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ject or a particularamendment. The instance is one in contradistinction to thirty-four state requests for consideration of whatever revisions
to the Constitution that a convention might deem appropriate, regardless of subject matter.
We quite agree that states may seek an unlimited constitutional
convention, despite what others might reasonably regard to be the
manifest unwisdom and possible unruliness of such an uncabined proceeding. We agree, that is, that when the desire for that style of convention is sufficiently plain, Congress should yield. Congress may not
frustrate the demand of thirty-four states for an unlimited convention,
notwithstanding whatever apprehensions Congress may (understandably) entertain of the wisdom of such a revolutionary group. It is significant that we do agree on this matter despite the very respectable
argument that such a radical use of article V is itself improper for the
states and that therefore Congress should turn back applications requesting an unlimited convention. I want to examine briefly the basis
for this argument because I believe that while it falls short, it is most
helpful in understanding why something much less than an unlimited
convention is itself plainly allowed.
The argument that unlimited conventions are not authorized by
article V, despite the absence of language so declaring, is an argument
based on "constitutional purpose." If the provision for a state-triggered
mode of amending the Constitution was included in contemplation of
reviewing specific grievances, then even though the article does not on
its face forbid state applications for an unlimited convention, perhaps
Congress (and the Supreme Court, insofar as the matter might under
some circumstances be subject to adjudication) ought so to interpret
article V. There would be no novelty in this way of proceeding, as
evidenced by the Supreme Court's own treatment of certain other constitutional provisions. For instance, the first amendment on its face excludes no kind of speech whatever from its protection. Nevertheless,
the Supreme Court has presumed to determine that certain kinds of
speech, such as obscenity, fall outside of the clause-that it was not the
design of the first amendment to provide freedom for that kind of
speech.5 If article V were subjected to a similarly limiting "purpose"
5. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). A counter example may be the famous commerce clause in article I, which provides Congress with the very general power to "regulate"
commerce among the several states. A fair amount of evidence suggests that the principal purpose
of the clause was to enable Congress to provide for a national free trade zone in order to overcome
state discriminatory taxes (on out-of-state goods), dislodge state-granted monopolies on interstate

commerce, and set aside discriminatory tariffs. Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing Dist., 120 U.S.
489 (1887), and Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) I (1824), are classic applications of the

clause for this purpose. Yet, the clause has not been thus limited and Congress has been sustained
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construction, then, for the following reasons, we might conclude that
unlimited conventions are the one kind of convention that may not be
called.
The felt necessity to establish a means of securing amendment to
the Constitution not dependent upon the concurrence of Congress was
a persistent theme at the Philadelphia Convention. A principal reason
for its persistence was the anxiety that the proposed Constitution might
prove defective insofar as it established broad powers for Congress in
terms intrinsically susceptible of abuse. If Congress were to exceed its
new powers and be sustained by a new, national supreme court in respect to its usurpations, 6 it would make no sense to commit constitutional amendment exclusively to Congress. As Congress' usurpations
of power in derogation of states rights or of personal liberties would be
the very occasion for moving to amend and repair the breach, the Constitution needed an emphatic provision to allow such repairs without
recourse to Congress.
Professor Dellinger accurately notes what was presented "at the
outset of the Convention,"' and he appropriately notes the animating
concern reflected in "[tihe Thirteenth Virginia Resolve, introduced on
May 29, 1787,. . . 'that provision ought to be made for the amendment
of the Articles of Union whensoever it shall seem necessary, and that
the assent of the NationalLegislatureought not to be requiredthereto.'
He is also proper in recording that "the principal issue, according to
Madison's notes, was 'the propriety of making the consent of the Natl.
Legisl. unnecessary,' "I and that "Randolph and Mason of Virginia defended the part of the resolution that made congressional assent unnecessary."'" Congruent with this emphasis, he points out how well the
very first draft to emerge from the Committee of Detail on August 6,
"8

in enacting laws that inhibit or forbid commerce among the states. See, e.g., Champion v. Ames,
188 U.S. 321 (1903). The primary reason for including the power may have been to secure a
national free trade zone, but the power given was broader--"to regulate," "to prescribe the rule by
which [such] commerce is to be governed." Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 195. The
Court yielded to the clause as written, and the clause contains no delimiting statement of purposes
to confine its use. Compare U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl.8 (copyright and patent clause) with U.S.
COrsT. amend. II ("right" to bear arms), both of which expressly limit the power or right thus

granted by specifying the purpose to which it shall be related.
6. As allegedly occurred almost at once in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).

The decision sustained an act of Congress providing federal court jurisdiction in a private diversity suit against a state, contrary to assurances of sovereign immunity given when the constitution
was under debate. The eleventh amendment was adopted in immediate response to the Chisholm
decision.
7. Dellinger, supra note 2, at 1626 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
8. id. (emphasis added).
9. Id.
10. Id.
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1787, reflected that concern in its proposed nineteenth article: "On the
application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the States in the Union,
for an amendment of this Constitution, the Legislature of the United
States shall call a Convention for that purpose." I
Less noted by Professor Dellinger were Madison's misgivings respecting the reinsertion of any congressional role in respect to this
mode of securing amendments. Under the proposed article, "the Legislature of the United States" would have to call a convention. The provision evidently meant to leave the national legislature no room to
manipulate the amendment process, but since the principal purpose of
the provision was to provide a means of checking untoward congressional usurpations, to involve Congress at all, even in this presumably
ministerial role, might be vexing: "Mr. Madison remarked on the
vagueness of the terms, 'call a Convention for the purpose,' as sufficient
reason for reconsidering the article. How was a Convention to be
formed? by what rule decide? what the force of its acts?"'" Accordingly, the article was reconsidered. 3 Madison, in the same session, reformulated it in the following form, which, as Professor Dellinger
properly noted, 14 was approved by a remarkable majority of nine states
to one (with one state divided):
The legislature of the U.S. whenever two thirds of both Houses
shall deem necessary, or on the application of two thirds of the Legislatures of the several States, shall propose amendments to this Constitution which shall be valid to all intents and purposes as part
thereof, when the same shall have been ratified by three fourths at
least of the Legislatures of the several States, or by Conventions in
three fourths thereof, as one or the other mode of ratification may be
proposed by the Legislature of the U.S. 5
Madison quite clearly regarded the role of Congress now reduced to a
manageable one: particular amendments would be formulated in state
legislatures and, when two-thirds agreed on an amendment, Congress
would be under a duty to direct it to state legislatures or state conventions in all the states for consideration.
Madison's Virginia colleague, George Mason, nonetheless thought
the congressional role remained excessive:
Col. Mason thought the plan of amending the Constitution exceptionable and dangerous. As the proposing of amendments is in both
the modes to depend, in the first immediately, and in the second,
ultimately on Congress, no amendments of the proper kind would
11. Id. 1627. This formulation was agreed to at once.
12. II THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 558 (M. Farrand ed. 1937).

13. Id.
14. Dellinger, supra note 2, at 1628.
15. II Farrand, supra note 12, at 559.
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ever be obtained by the people, if the Government 6should become
be the case.'

oppressive, as he verily believed would
Note again Mason's own reiterated concern-that the likely occasion
for particular amendments would arise from self-aggrandizing usurpa-

tions by the national government-for which he wanted a swift and
effective means of state-controlled correction utterly independent of

Congress.1 7 Mason evidently feared that involving Congress, even for
the purpose of routing specific amendments already proposed in appli-

cations of two-thirds of the state legislatures, would imperil the security
of this mode of securing amendments insofar as Congress might will-

fully refuse to perform that task.
Madison's immediate response to his colleague is illuminating. He
expresses no disagreement at all respecting the need to provide a fail-

safe means by which state legislatures could move for amendments responsive to particular developments. Rather, he argues that the draft
16. Id. 629.
17. That article VI as finally formulated was meant to provide recourse against particular
shortcomings and that it was meant to provide state legislatures with the means of moving against
those particular shortcomings, was emphatically reiterated both by Madison and by Hamilton in
the Federalist Papers. Thus, in Federalist No. 43, Madison endorsed the Constitution by observing:
That useful alterations will be suggested by experience could not but be foreseen. It
was requisite, therefore, that a mode for introducing them should be provided. The
mode preferred by the [Philadelphia] convention seems to be stamped with every mark
of propriety. It guards equally against that extreme facility, which would render the
Constitution too mutable; and that extreme difficulty, which might perpetrate its discovered faults. It, moreover, equally enables the general and the State governments to originate the amendment of errors, as they may be pointed out by the experience on one side,
or on the other.
I THa FEDERALIST No. 43, at 301-02 (E. Bourne ed. 1901). And note how Hamilton (the thoroughgoing nationalist), wrote even more reassuringly of the state mode of securing particular
amendments once the Constitution would be ratified, in Federalist No. 85:
If.. . the Constitution proposed should once be ratified by all the States as it stands,
alterations in it may at any time be effected by nine States. Here, then, the chances are as
thirteen to ninet in favor of subsequent amendment, rather than of the original adoption
of an entire system. [Hamilton's footnote, t, read instructively: "It may rather be said
TEN, for though two thirdsmay set onfoot the measure, three fourths must ratify." (Emphasis added.) Hamilton then continues as follows.]
This is not all. Every Constitution for the United States must inevitably consist of a
great variety of particulars, in which thirteen independent States are to be accommodated in their interests or opinions of interest. * * *
But every amendment to the Constitution, if once established, would be a single
proposition, and might be brought forward singly. There would then be no necessity for
management or compromise, in relation to any other point-no giving nor taking. The
will of the requisitenumber would at once bringthe matter to a decisive issue. And consequently, whenevernine, or ratherten States, were unitedin the desireof aparticularamendment that amendment must infallibly takeplace. There can, therefore, be no comparison
between the facility of affecting an amendment, and that of establishing in the first instance a complete Constitution.
II The Federalist No. 85, at 168-69 (E. Bourne ed. 1901) (emphasis added). The paragraphs seem
very plain: nine states united on the desirability of a particular amendment may require a convention to be held for its speedy and uncompromised review; should the proposal be agreed to in
convention, ratification by ten states insures that the particular amendment "infallibly take(s)
place."
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he is now defending (which omits any provision for Congress to call a
convention at which such amendments shall be considered) is at least
as failsafe as the earlier draft pursuant to which Congress must call a
convention to consider such amendments. He is perplexed by Mason's
objection only in the following respect:
Mr. Madison did not see why Congress would not be as much bound
to propose amendments applied for by two thirds of the States as to
call a Convention on the like application. He saw no objection however against providing for a Convention for the purpose of amendments, except only that difficulties might arise as to the form, the
quorum, etc. which in Constitutional regulations ought to be as much
as possible avoided."8
We need to pause here, before running through so many snippets
of quotation and drafts as to become confused about where all this is
supposed to lead. I have reviewed things thus far only to show some
modest (but not trivial) points of agreement. The first point is that securing a way to propose and to submit for ratification amendments
other than those that might originate in or be congenial to extraordinary majorities in Congress was a steadfast determination in the Philadelphia Convention. The second point is that the most expected use of
that authority would be in response to alleged usurpations, whether of
states' rights or of personal liberties, by the national government itself.
As to all other kinds of amendments, provision for Congress to propose
them was presumably both safe and sufficient. So far, so good, without
in the least presuming to say that nothing else happened or that we
have yet worked out all the issues.
But pausing here is useful because it raises a fair question. Is an
unlimited constitutional convention within article V at all? If the purpose of article V is by one mode to permit Congress to propose
whatever amendments it deems appropriate from time to time (whether
one or several, whether narrow or very broad), and by a different mode
to enable the states to gain specific recourse against particularusurpations that Congress may have no interest whatever in correcting, then it
might not be unreasonable for Congress to reject state legislative applications that seek a convention of unlimited revisory power over the
entire Constitution. That kind of "second Philadelphia" (or new Armageddon), one might argue, so far outstrips the rationale for an independent state mode of securing particular kinds of amendments that
Congress would be warranted in turning back such applications. In
brief, a modest case can be made that article V presupposes that when
state legislatures wish to secure constitutional amendment, they will
18. II Farrand, supra note 12, at 629-30.
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identify the particular proposal adequately to enable Congress to determine whether that felt need is sufficiently well shared by thirty-three
other states to require calling a convention. Subject-matter consensus
among the applications is implicitly required because state-initiated
conventions are inappropriate forums for merely generalized grievances, much less for revolutionary purposes, but entirely appropriate
for the thoughtful review of more particularized proposals.
This, as I say, is simply the bare outline of an argument. It is not
inconsistent with the text of article V and it is respectful of concerns
that played a crucial role in the production of article V. Moreover,
were the country caught up in the hysteria of a proverbial "man on
horseback," a charismatic figure capable of galvanizing passions for
fascism to sweep away the Constitution by precipitating a convention
"called" for that purpose, I would be sorely tempted to embrace this
argument and fervently to urge Congress to turn aside state legislative
applications demanding an "unlimited" convention. I would argue
that the applications exceed any proper purpose consistent with article
V and hope, thereby, to gain time until calm might be restored. Barring those extraordinary circumstances, however, I would not embrace
the argument against state-initiated unlimited conventions. While I regard the argument against them as "not bad," I also think it is unsound.
The principal reasons why particular portions of the Constitution were
included are always of historical interest, of course, and, in very close
cases of contemporary interpretation, may appropriately make some
difference. Quite often, however (as with the commerce clause, the declaration of war clause, and I dare say article V as well), the particular
reasons that gave rise to agreement to include a particular power in the
Constitution were not enacted as a limitation on the uses of that power.
And as enacted, the power of state legislatures to secure a convention
did not restrict them to a convention at which only a particular amendment or only a particular subject might be considered. Thus, though a
convention of broader purposes would seem to me undesirable to contemplate (at best pointless to hold, and at worst disastrous in its work
products), I do not think that article V forbids such a convention or
that such an implied limitation should be "read into" article V by Congress. If thirty-four state applications call for an unlimited constitutional convention, then that is what Congress should provide.
Willing to construe article V generously in this regard (that is, favorably with respect to the authority it vests in state legislatures and
without implied limitations on its use), however, I do find it perfectly
remarkable that some have argued for a construction not merely limiting the power of state legislatures to have a convention, but limiting
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that power to its least expected, least appropriate, and yet most dangerous use. This is the argument that article V forbids the states from
applying for a convention to consider a particular amendment and authorizes them, rather, to secure a convention only if the convention is to
be of unlimited proposing authority. There are two variations of this
argument. Neither seems either plausible or desirable, as each frames
an arbitrary "Catch 22" as a deliberate discouragement to state applications for the least dangerous kind of convention-a convention to
meet and to determine whether a specific (and not necessarily very farreaching) requested amendment should be proposed for ratification.
One variant holds that Congress should flatly disregard petitions for
such a limited convention.' 9 The other variant, Professor Dellinger's,
holds that state legislatures should be instructed by Congress that
whatever their application may say, if Congress does call such a convention it will only callone of unlimitedpower. Unless, then, the grievance of thirty-four state legislatures is of such intensity that those states
are willing to take their chances in an unlimited convention, they may
have no constitutional convention at all. Nothing we have reviewed
thus far supplies any reason for such a peculiar (and hostile) construction of article V. Were there nothing else to be said, I do not know
what could support that view except, perhaps, an abiding apprehension
that state-initiated amendments to the Constitution are likely to be destructive or ill-advised and therefore article V should be [mis]construed
to make them virtually impossible.
Professor Dellinger has written that there is more to be said, however, and that the case against the validity of a limited convention is
stronger. He locates the centerpiece of that stronger case in Madison's
initial draft20 (first approved by a vote of nine to one, one state divided), which provided for but two steps with respect to state-initiated
amendments: whenever the applications of two-thirds of the state legislatures agreed on the wording of an amendment to be proposed, Congress would, upon receipt of those applications, be under a clerical duty
to submit the amendment to all legislatures or conventions for ratification. This formulation, as we know, ultimately was modified to provide
for three steps: whenever sufficient applications were received, they
first had to clear a convention that itself agreed to propose the amendment, and only then would Congress remit to state legislatures or conventions for ratification. Professor Dellinger infers that the convention
is not to be limited and cannot be limited, because that would be incompatible with"the requirement that there be a convention added to
19. Black, Amending the Constitution: A Letter to a Congressman, 82 YALE L.L 189 (1972).
20. See text accompanying note 14 supra.
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the process for the very purpose of forestalling precipitous amendments. In my earlier essay,"1 I had hypothesized the following case:
If two-thirds of the state legislatures might perchance agree on the
exact wording of an amendment they would wish to be reviewed in a
called convention for discussion and vote, this would seem to me to
state the paradigm case in which Congress should proceed with the
call-and limit the agenda exactly in accordance with the22unequivocal expressions of those solely responsible for the event.
Professor Dellinger demurred:
This approach, though it provides a means of proposing amendments
that is free of congressional control, is not responsive to the second
aim of the Philadelphia Convention; state legislatures should not be
given authority to propose amendments without the involvement of
some national body in the formulation of such amendments. To permit the state legislatures to dictate to the convention the exact terms
of its proposals is to short-circuit the carefully structured division of
authority between state and national interests.2 "
Respectfully, I think Professor Dellinger has read into the change from
the Madison formulation to the final formulation more than can be
found there. I quite agree that the addition of a convention was meant
to provide a useful check against unduly precipitate state-proposed/state-ratified amendments. The question is the extent of the
check thus provided. The answer is that the check is substantial and
wholly consistent with a very deliberative, national body convoked in
contemplation of a specific agenda. In brief, we do not need to impute
to a convention the unlimited power to propose amendments contrary
to a uniform stipulated desire of the applicant state legislatures in order
to understand that a convention may serve nonetheless as an additional
and important buffer against hasty or ill-considered particular amendments.
The final form of article V does indeed differ significantly from
Madison's original draft. First, in calling a convention to consider a
subject or proposal that thirty-four state legislatures may submit by application, Congress has the acknowleged discretion (at least within reason) to compose that convention as it believes best serves national
interests-a marked departure from Madison's proposal. Indeed, as
you will recall, Madison expressly adverted to this difference and personally expressed misgivings about it. It is a material change; in specifying how delegates to that convention are to be selected (or elected), in
specifying the formula for determining the size of the convention, et
cetera, Congress may provide for an array of representatives both
21. See note 1 supra.
22. Dellinger, supra note 2, at 1632 (quoting Van Alstyne, supra note 1, at 1305-06).
23. Id.
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broader than and different from the state office holders or particular
constituencies originally successful in having the convention convoked.
Second, the convention would include persons and states that had not
joined in the common call, who would be heard in this common national forum from perspectives not necessarily so well represented
among the legislatures of the convoking states. Third, the convention,
without doubt free to debate the wisdom of an amendment, might well
conclude as a deliberative body that the proposal is not as simple or as
free from disabling criticism as it may first have appeared to the states.
Fourth, all of the preceding developments (each added to the Madison
formula) take time-a further buffer against hasty or precipitate use of
the amending process. Finally, after the convention rises, Congress still
retains full discretion as to which mode of ratification to require for any
amendment already afflirmatively reviewed and approved by the convention. This congressionally controlled choice itself provides additional moderate leverage, since Congress may elect the mode that, in its
view, is more likely to provide the "safer" course.
Thus, to require a national convention assembled as a deliberative
body to consider the appropriateness of a proposed amendment-a
convention flanked on both sides by congressional discretion to designate both the composition of that convention and thereafter the mode
of ratification-is itself a major change. This is true even supposing
that two-thirds of the state legislatures may already have agreed with
remarkable uniformity to the need for a precisely framed amendment
to the Constitution. Indeed, the compromise thoroughly guards against
the possibility that rash or ill-considered, state-formulated amendments
will become part of the Constitution, in contrast to the far greater celerity with which congressionally-proposed amendments may pass into
fundamental law.24
24. In accord with this view are the following.
The States, of course, are given a major role under Article V both in initiating a

convention movement and in finally ratifying a convention's work. In addition, as we
have seen, one of the major reasons for incorporating the convention method of amending the Constitution into our basic law was to create a remedy by which the States, in the
event Congress was unwilling to act, could compel action. The convention method of
amending the Constitution would be reduced to an unworkable absurdity both from the

standpoint of the States having a voice in the convention process and from the magnitude of the operation and its ultimate effect on our Government, if only general conven-

tions were permissible under article V.

C. BRICKFIELD, PROBLEMS RELATING TO A FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, 85TH
CONG. IST SEss. 20 (Comm. Print 1957) (footnote omitted). "It is our conclusion that Congress
has the power to establish procedures governing the calling of a national constitutional convention
limited to the subject matter on which the legislatures of two-thirds of the states request a convention." SPECIAL CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION STUDY COMMITTEE, AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION BY THE CONVENTION METHOD UNDER ARTICLE V 9 (1973).
The above conclusion, unanimously endorsed by the Committee (which included Professor
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In retrospect we may note that given the compromise, it can come
as no surprise that this mode of amendment to the Constitution still has
Albert Sacks, Dean of the Harvard Law School), was approved by the ABA House of Delegates.
The resolution stated: "2. Congress has the power to establish procedures limiting a convention to
the subject matter which is stated in the applications received from the state legislatures." Id. vii.
If Congress receives within a "reasonable" time period, proper applications for an article
V convention to deal with a certain subject from two-thirds of the state legislatures, it is
absolutely bound to convene such a body.
The argument that an article V convention is sovereign and therefore beyond external control is specious.
[A]n agreement that a convention ought to be held is required among two-thirds of the
state legislatures before Congress is empowered to convene such a body. No article V
convention may be called in the absence of such a consensus. If the agreement contemplates a convention dealing only with a certain subject matter, as opposed to constitutional revision generally, then the convention must logically be limited to that subject
matter.
If the state applications, of their own force, can so bind the convention, then Congress must disregard and refuse to transmit for ratification any proposed amendment
which concerns a different subject matter.
Certainly Congress would be under a duty to call a general convention if two-thirds of
the state legislatures properly ask for one. Equally obvious should be its right and obligation to limit the scope of a convention to the subject matter requested by the state
applications.
Bonfield, The Dirksen Amendment and the Article V Convention Process, 66 MICH. L. REV. 949,
977, 994, 996 (1968).
If the requisite majority of legislatures is directed solely to the end of calling a convention to propose amendment on a given subject matter, it is in keeping with the underlying purpose of the alternative amendment procedure for Congress to limit the
convention to such proposals. The general purpose of the alternative amendment provision is to provide something of a safety valve in case the state legislatures are deeply
troubled about a matter in which Congress refuses to correct by invoking its own power
to propose amendments. . . . Indeed, the usefulness of the alternative amendment procedure as a means of dealing with a specific grievance on the part of the states will be
defeated if the states are told that it can be invoked only at the price of subjecting the
nation to all the problems, expense, and risks involved in having a wide open constitutional convention.
Kauper, The Alternative Amendment Process: Some Observations, 66 MICH. L. REv. 903, 912
(1968). "As to the scope of a convention's deliberations, would it not be illogical to allow the
states to bring about a convention while giving Congress power to thwart the whole undertaking
by assigning responsibilities other than those originally contemplated by the states?" McCleskey,
Along the Midway: Some Thoughts on DemocraticConstitution-Amending,66 MICH. L. REV. 1001,
1005 (1968).
Congress is to call a Convention on the application of the legislatures of the states. Congress is not free to call a Convention at its pleasure. It can only act upon the states'
application; and if Congress can only act upon their application, it cannot go beyond the
purpose for which the states have applied. If they apply for a Convention on a balanced
budget, Congress must call a Convention on a balanced budget. It cannot at its pleasure
enlarge the topics. Nor can the Convention go beyond what Congress has specified in
the call.
Noonan, The Convention Methodof ConstitutionalAmendment-ItsMeaning, Usefulness, and Wisdom, 10 PAC. L.J. 641, 642 (1979).
The foregoing analysis reveals that state legislatures may petition Congress to convene a constitutional convention for proposing amendments dealing with a particular
subject, several subjects, or general constitutional revision. Congress, by virtue of its
necessary and proper clause powers, may define and restrict the work of an article V
convention through the convention call. Finally, consistent with the reasonable intent of
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not been successfully employed. The carefully wrought delays, references, and cross references it involves may well have been too careful.
Viewed in that light, perhaps Madison was correct in desiring the
somewhat easier way he originally outlined for amendments originating with the states-the proposal not requiring the insertion of any convention at all. And however that may be, it is truly quite startling that
some writers have presumed to urge that the state mode of securing

amendments
be "interpreted" to make it even more difficult to em25
ploy.
Finally, I want to go back to the very beginning of this letter, to a
declaration that might now otherwise seem very odd. It was the suggestion that in fact, appearances to the contrary notwithstanding, the
"area of actual disagreement" between Professor Dellinger's views and
my own is, in the end, "rather marginal." In an effort to see just how
differently we think Congress should respond if it were to receive identically worded state legislative applications contemplating a particular
amendment to be considered in convention, I prepared the following
hypothetical case. It imagines an extremely popular two-term President, barred from re-election by the twenty-second amendment which
the framers, Congress is obliged to limit the scope of a convention to the general subject
matter or problem at which the state applications are directed.
Rhodes, A Limited FederalConstitutionalConvention, 26 U. FLA. L. REv. 1, 18 (1973).

Although it would be contrary to article V if Congress attempted to limit the scope
of a convention when the states had applied for an open convention, it would seem to be
consistent with, if not compelled by, the article for Congress to limit the convention in
accordance with the express desires of the applicant states.
Note, ProposedLegislation on the Convention Method ofAmending the UnitedStates Constitution,

85 HARV. L. REv. 1612, 1628-29 (1972) (footnote omitted). In 1971, S.215, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.
provided that "[wihenever applications made by two-thirds or more of the States with respect to
shall be the duty of such House to determine that
the same subject have been received ... [i]t
there are in effect valid applications made by two-thirds of the States with respect to the same
subject [and] it shall be the duty of that House to agree to a concurrent resolution calling for the
convening of a Federal constitutional convention upon that subject." The bill was approved by
eighty-four votes to zero in the Senate. 117 CONG. REc. 36804 (1971). A vote in the House was
forestalled by adjournment.
25. Ackerman, UnconstitutionalConvention, New Republic, Mar. 3, 1979, at 8 (essentially a
brief editorial); Black, Amendment by National ConstitutionalConvention: A Letter To A Senator,
32 OKLA. L. REv. 626 (1979); Black, Amending the Constitution: A Letter to a Congressman, 82

YALE L.J. 189 (1979); Dellinger, supra note 2.
The prolific Professor Tribe, in an article based upon testimony before the California State
Assembly, strenuously opposed a call for a limited convention but went no further than to maintain that the validity of a limited convention lacks an authoritative answer. Tribe, IssuesRaisedby
Requesting Congressto Calla ConstitutionalConventionto Proposea BalancedBudgetAmendment,

10 PAC. L. REv. 627 (1979). Professor Gunther writes that his "own best judgment is that 'Applications' from the states can be limited in subject matter, so long as they are not too specific," (!),
Gunther, ConstitutionalBrinksmanship: Stumbling Toward a Convention, 65 A.B.A.J. 1046, 1049

(1979), but suggests that should a convention nevertheless insist upon producing amendments on
other matters (a likelihood that in turn strikes me as exceedingly remote), "it has a persuasive
claim to have its proposals submitted to ratification." Id.
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RECURRING ANSWER

Congress (being dominated by the opposing party) will not propose for
repeal. In response, thirty-four states submit identically worded resolutions to Congress during a nine-month period, all declaring:
WHEREAS The Constitution of the United States did not originally
restrict the election of a person as President;
WHEREAS The restriction imposed solely by force of the TwentySecond Amendment does not now appear to be a necessary or proper
limitation on the means or ends of enlightened government in the
United States; and
WHEREAS The Congress of the United States has itself not proposed an amendment to repeal the Twenty-Second Amendment,
THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED that the Legislature of [name of
state] hereby submits its application to The Congress of the United
States pursuant to Article V of the Constitution, respectfully requesting that a Convention be called for the purpose of considering an
amendment that, when duly proposed and ratified, would repeal the
Twenty-Second Amendment.
Question: How should Congress respond to these identically-worded,
state legislative applications?
1. Decline to take any action whatever.
2. Resolve affirmatively that the applications thus received are insufficient applications under article V insofar as each, in the
opinion of Congress, fails to request that a convention be called
not merely to consider a particular proposal but all other proposals for amending the Constitution as may be brought before it as
well.
3. Proceed to call a convention "for the purpose of considering an
amendment that, when duly proposed and ratified, would repeal
the Twenty-Second Amendment."
4. Proceed to call a convention "in accordance with the applications properly submitted by the legislatures of two-thirds of the
several states."
5. Do something else, for example, itself at once propose by twothirds majority an amendment that, if ratified within seven years
by the legislatures of three-fourths of the states, would repeal the
twenty-second amendment, and thereupon direct that notice be
sent to the respective petitioning state legislatures inquiring
whether in light of the congressional action just taken, the legislatures still deem their applications for a convention appropriate.
Quite plainly, my own view would be that the proper answer is
either 3 or 4; that is, Congress might appropriately proceed to call a
convention "in accordance with the applications properly submitted by
the legislatures of two-thirds of the several states," although I believe
answer 3 would be a proper and not unreasonable manner of framing
the call as well. It is instructive that Professor Dellinger checked answer 4, rather than either answers 1 (decline to act) or 2 (declare the
applications insufficient). He did, however, footnote his answer with
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this qualification: "Unless it appears from the context that the applications were based upon an understanding that the convention would be
precluded from considering alternatives (such as a six-year term). 26
Insofar as the difference between us is truly as slight as this, I am
pleased with the outcome.
Sincerely,
William Van Alstyne

26. Personal communication.

